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YES, AND:  CORE CONCERNS, INTERNAL
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MINDFULNESS FOR EMOTIONAL
BALANCE, LIE DETECTION, AND
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION
Clark Freshman*
Leonard Riskin’s article, Further Beyond Reason, illustrates many useful
points about emotion, negotiation, and mindfulness.  Both as one of the authors
Professor Riskin cites for the enormous effects of emotion on negotiation,1 and
as an author of several works concerning various forms of meditation that may
help optimize emotion in negotiation,2 I agree that emotion deserves careful
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1 Leonard Riskin, Further Beyond Reason:  Mindfulness, Emotions, and the Core Concerns
in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289 n. 30 and accompanying text.  On my views on how emo-
tion affects negotiation, see generally Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, The
Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist:  What We Know and Don’t Know About How Mood
Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 5 (2002) [hereinafter Freshman et
al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist] (reviewing research on how emotion affects nego-
tiation and suggesting how it may be similar—and potentially different—when applied to
lawyers and/or negotiations involving legal issues); Clark Freshman, Identity, Beliefs, Emo-
tion, and Negotiation Success, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 99 (Michael L.
Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) [hereinafter Freshman, Emotion, Identity, and
Negotiation Success] (explaining that emotions may be triggered by different expectations
from the culture of an individual and her or his sense of identity, and these emotions may in
turn affect negotiation); Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes & Greg Feldman, Efficient Emotion:
How Emotions Affect First Year Law Grades, Negotiation Performance, and Mental Health
(May 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Freshman et al.,
Efficient Emotion].
2 In earlier works, like Riskin, I focused on internal mindfulness:  how a given individual
becomes aware of her or his own internal thoughts, emotions, and so on.  In particular, see
Clark Freshman, Adele M. Hayes & Greg C. Feldman, Adapting Meditation to Promote
Negotiation Success:  A Guide to Varieties and Scientific Support, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
67 (2002) [hereinafter Freshman et al., Meditation and Negotiation Success].  In later works,
I focused on the importance of what I called external mindfulness:  awareness of the
thoughts—particularly heightened cognitive load—and emotions of others, both of which
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attention.  I agree, too, that mindfulness meditation and related practices may
improve negotiation.  Furthermore, I concur with Dan Shapiro and Roger
Fisher (a co-author of the bestselling Getting to Yes) that attention to certain
“core concerns” may be valuable in many ways.3  Yet this Article suggests that
both parts of Riskin’s latest article and parts of the argument on “core con-
cerns” by Fisher and Shapiro4 may, with certain individuals in certain circum-
stances, not work; indeed, focusing on core concerns may even produce less
functional emotions and therefore decrease the chances of an optimal outcome.
This Article addresses the limitations inherent within the core concerns
approach and suggests “external mindfulness” as a complementary skill to
check when core concerns help and when other tools, including both internal
and external mindfulness, may help as well as—or better than—the core con-
cerns approach.
In earlier works, like Riskin, I focused on internal mindfulness:  how a
given individual becomes aware of her or his own internal thoughts, emotions,
and so on.5  In later works, I focused on the importance of what I called exter-
nal mindfulness:  awareness of the thoughts—particularly the heightened cog-
may give us important insights on their own for negotiation and may improve our ability to
detect deception. See Clark Freshman, After Basic Mindfulness Meditation:  External Mind-
fulness, Emotional Truthfulness, and Lie Detection in Dispute Resolution, 2006 J. DISP.
RESOL. 511 (2006) [hereinafter Freshman, External Mindfulness, Negotiation, and Lie
Detection].
3 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON:  USING EMOTIONS AS YOU NEGOTI-
ATE (2005).
4 I use the somewhat wordy phrases such as “Riskin’s latest article” rather than “Riskin”
and “the argument on ‘core concerns’” by Fisher and Shapiro deliberately for several rea-
sons.  Riskin’s article has many very important points unrelated to the “points” about which I
have doubts; I doubt not that they work, but question how well they will work in certain
circumstances.  So, too, Riskin’s “latest article” is certainly not the beginning of his work in
this area, and I hope to learn more from his future works.  And, finally, no one is defined by
her or his writing, particularly someone so gifted as a teacher, mediator, mentor, and friend
as Riskin.  To put this footnote in scholarly context, an overlapping consensus, as John
Rawls would put it, of otherwise diverse scholarship agrees that individuals cannot be cap-
tured in some single moment of evolving scholarship. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1993) (a leading left-leaning philosopher arguing some institution may be more
just if there is an overlapping consensus of otherwise diverse views that supports it); ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (a leading libertarian—some might say
“conservating philosopher”—saying his arguments in a given book can barely capture his
ever-shifting views); RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995) (a leading conservative
judge and former law professor borrowing the philosophical argument that any given indi-
vidual has “future selves” that may be very different from the current self); JOSEPH GOLD-
STEIN, ONE DHARMA 140-42 (2002) (a leading American Buddhist teacher explaining the
core Buddhist teaching of “no self”:  individuals change according to shifting causes and
conditions); Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution:  Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA
L. REV 1687 (1997) (one version of postmodern theory shows that current conditions mean
that all things are shifting and difficult to define over time).
5 In particular, see Freshman et al., Meditation and Negotiation Success, supra note 2, at 68,
for a response to Riskin’s suggestion that lawyers turn to mindfulness by showing how a
variety of meditative techniques produce similar benefits and how any given individual may
find some techniques fit better or worse.
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nitive load—and emotions of others, both of which on their own may give us
important insights for negotiation and improve our ability to detect deception.6
Riskin sets out his claims through a vivid example of a business divorce
and a careful logical argument.  It is a model that appeals to the mind, the heart,
and the gut; I follow his lead.  For those who have not read Riskin’s piece—or
who have not read it mindfully enough to recall his business divorce exam-
ple—a brief summary follows.
First, the mind of the piece makes several related claims.  Riskin argues
that conflicts are best resolved using the interest-based model, popularized by
Getting to Yes7 and further distilled by the Harvard Project on Negotiation to
seven elements:  interests, legitimacy, relationships, alternatives,
options, commitments, and communication.8  Here, “best resolved” deserves
some unpacking.  At the individual level, a conflict could be “best resolved”
from the point of view of any party to the negotiation, such as Riskin’s hypo-
thetical businesspeople, Jack and Phil.9  Meanwhile, at the ideological level, a
conflict is “best resolved” where the final solution is a “wise” one that reflects
“objective standards” rather than mere background power or negotiation
maneuvers.10  Interest-based ideology tries to close this gap between individual
satisfaction and its ideological commitments by noting that agreements not
based on objective criteria, or those that do not give some attention to other
“stakeholders” affected by the negotiation, will not be stable.11
6 See generally Freshman, External Mindfulness, Negotiation, and Lie Detection, supra
note 2; Freshman, Emotion, Identity, and Negotiation Success, supra note 1.
7 Riskin, supra note 1, at n. 10, citing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 83 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991)).  If one
scratches the surface, it turns out that a female business professor at Harvard Business
School actually used the idea of negotiating to meet underlying interests many decades ear-
lier.  Brian R. Fry & Lotte L. Thomas, Mary Parker Follett:  Assessing the Contribution and
Impact of Her Writings, 2 J. MGMT. HIST. 11, 12 (1996).
8 Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Glossary of Terms:  “seven elements,”
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/glossary/ (last visited June 5, 2010); see also Bruce Patton,
Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 1, at 279, 280.
9 Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?:  A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (explaining
that individuals may sometimes support agreements reached in mediation because they feel
more satisfied with the process), with TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 111 (2006)
(arguing that satisfaction with the mediation process may reflect “false consciousness” when
it compromises the real interests of the parties).
10 FISHER & URY, supra note 7, at 82-83 (defining a wise agreement as one based on objec-
tive standards).
11 There is some evidence for this. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudica-
tion in the Small Claims Court:  The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, L. & SOC.
REV. 323, 324 (1995) (surveying studies that parties are more likely to comply with agree-
ments they reach in mediation than with those ordered by courts).  From my own point of
view, I suspect what is best for any given individual in any given negotiation may sometimes
track what is best for various others.  Sometimes this is because others may indeed under-
mine agreements if their own interests are not accommodated.  At other times, a given indi-
vidual may have an interest in others being happy as well (like a mother and a child) or may
have an interest in being seen as caring about others (such as a politician or others concerned
with reputation).  In other instances, what is best for an individual may depend far less on
how it affects others.  Overall, I worry that the language of “wise agreements” and “stake-
holders” may mask the interest that some negotiation writers and teachers have that others
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Second, the heart of the piece says that emotion often affects a negotia-
tor’s ability to achieve the best agreements.  Although Riskin mentions how
positive emotions matter, he spends more time discussing how negative emo-
tions get in the way of reaching objectively wise agreements.  In a similar way,
Shapiro and Fisher’s book claimed that it would be too “daunting” to work
directly with the “many” distinct emotions.12  They therefore suggested that
negotiators may defuse negative emotion and foster positive emotion “indi-
rectly” by paying attention to core concerns.  For his part, Riskin’s current arti-
cle suggests that mindfulness can help negotiators better work with these five
core concerns: appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role.13
Third, Riskin suggests that various forms of “mindfulness” and related
practices will make it easier to attend to core concerns, thus taming negative
emotions, harnessing positive emotions, and fulfilling the promise of efficient,
fair, and wise agreements that give parties what they “need.”  Using core con-
cerns to overcome emotional barriers makes logical sense, yet it often fails for a
variety of reasons.
To illustrate his claims, Riskin uses an example involving a vivid business
divorce,14 and this Article works with the same example, which I’ve summa-
rized in the italicized material that follows:
Many years ago, close friends Jack and Phil formed a boiler manufacturing com-
pany.15  Their initial agreement appeared to create value by pairing complimentary
differences:  Phil handled the office and Jack handled sales.16 As years passed,
things changed on two fronts.  Although Jack had handled all sales on his own for
many years, Phil put his son, Phil, Junior, in charge of sales in the Southeast while
Jack kept Midwest sales.  After taking over the Southeast, Phil, Junior brought in
more sales than Jack.  Phil and his son think Jack’s sales style relies too heavily on
socializing, and Jack thinks Phil, Junior’s success was merely a result of economic
growth in the Southeast.17
“be fair” or “do the right thing” as judged by the writers themselves. Cf. Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 9 (arguing that individuals in a dispute may be the best judge of what is best for R
themselves in settling a claim).
12 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 12; see also Riskin, supra note 1, at 299.
13 When I first read Riskin’s article, I thought that he had “adopted” the claim that core
concerns work better than addressing emotions directly.  We traded several emails about
this.  As I re-read his piece, it became clearer to me that his current article simply makes the
quite reasonable and useful claim that, if one wants to pay attention to core concerns, then
mindfulness helps.  Of course, it also implicitly claims that it really is worth addressing core
concerns.  As I mentioned, I agree with both claims.  I also suspect that Riskin would agree
with me that, if one is concerned with emotion, external mindfulness might also be helpful.
And I suspect that both he and I would agree that there may be still other approaches that
would be helpful as well.
14 Riskin, supra note 1, at 295-96.
15 A digression on the unconscious:  the boiler business “overheats,” and Riskin, following
Shapiro and Fisher, suggests one generally check their emotional temperature!
16 See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 7 (creating value often comes from differences);
DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986) (trading on
differences can create value); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Nego-
tiation:  The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
17 Often success depends just on being in right place at right time, such as Bill Gates’s
opportunity to master computers because his school gave students more access to computers
than comparable schools at the time. MALCOM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS:  THE STORY OF SUC-
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According to Riskin, habitual negotiating—and lawyering—would get to
the wrong solution.  Conversely, the trio of interest-based negotiation, core
concerns, and mindfulness would reveal the best solutions.  Habitual lawyering
would cling to narrow legal questions, such as the authority of Phil to put his
son, Phil, Junior, in charge.18  However, if Phil and Jack, or at least their law-
yers, had read Getting to Yes, they could try to understand—or, perhaps, feel—
each other’s underlying interests and reach a more creative and fair agree-
ment.19  Nonetheless, Riskin notes that negative emotions might get in the way
of a successful resolution and cause the parties to become angry and “posi-
tional” instead.
Enter, then, the core concerns.  Rather than address emotion directly,20
Riskin instead suggests that Jack or Phil might address the far less numerous
five core concerns.  Jack might, for example, play to Phil’s autonomy and sug-
gest they brainstorm solutions to their problems together.  Alas, try as Jack
CESS 53 (2008); see generally RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO GET IT:
WHY SCHOOLS AND CULTURES COUNT (2009).
18 Thank goodness, Riskin agrees that this tendency of lawyers to see things in terms of
legal issues is partly a product of impersonal forces that shape the way lawyers see problems.
In the months since I wrote this, and even just after attending a meeting with dozens of
professors from around the globe on innovation in teaching negotiation, I still just found
myself hearing voices in my head asking:  Does Phil’s decision to hire his son reflect an
illegal form of nepotism that closes a key job to those not sharing his race? See Clark
Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism?  How Social Scientific Theories Identify
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 313, 319 (2002) (explaining that preferences to hire one like oneself, conscious or
unconscious, inevitably benefit those from this in-group at the expense of all others).  Does
Phil’s decision violate some kind of corporate opportunity doctrine or duty to minority
shareholders by potentially putting the benefit to him and his son at the expense of a better
manager?  I think Riskin would forgive “me” as he forgives “himself”:  in an early article on
mindfulness, he shared how, while writing about being mindful, he spilled coffee—twice!
See infra note 83.
19 Like much of law, and like much of economics, from which negotiation theories borrow
heavily, even interest-based negotiation often hovers in the mind rather than the heart;
indeed, as this Article and other works explain, the heart (or at least certain feelings) is seen
as an obstacle to be overcome. Compare ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND-WINNING:  NEGOTIAT-
ING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 4, 44-68 (2000) (positing a “tension”
between empathy and assertiveness), with Michelle LeBaron & Mario Patera, Reflective
Practice in the New Millennium, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING:  INNOVATIONS
FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 45, 48 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De
Palo eds., 2009) (suggesting negotiation teaching may rely too heavily on cognitive
approaches), and LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR (4th ed.
2009) (emphasizing the importance of both cognition and feeling). See generally MALCOLM
GLADWELL, BLINK:  THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005) (generally cited
for the idea that people’s fast decisions—which occur in a blink of an eye—are good, but
actually citing evidence that quick decisions only work for experts with lots of experience
with similar problems)]; cf. Maureen O’Sullivan, Truth Wizards:  What They Know and
How They Know It (August 2007) (unpublished manuscript, previously presented as Emo-
tion Regulation in Accurate Lie Detection:  Accusatory Reluctance and the Control of
Prejudice, as part of the symposium on Emotional Regulation from Multiple Perspectives at
the biannual meeting of the International Society for Research on Emotion) (on file with
author) (according to O’Sullivan’s decades of research, most people make snap judgments
about who is lying and stick with them, but those best at detecting lies tend to go back and
forth before coming to a more nuanced conclusion).
20 Riskin, supra note 1; FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3.
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might, however, Phil may offend Jack with an insensitive comment, or Phil’s
negativity simply might infect Jack, causing him to participate half-heartedly in
the brainstorming, if at all.  Now, enter mindfulness.  Riskin believes that Jack
and Phil could practice mindfulness both to remind them to attend to the core
concerns in the first place and to keep the negotiation productive and moving
towards a wise solution.21
All told, it is a promising story, and I have no doubt it may work for some
people. Yet therein lies our problem.  Riskin’s theory returns to the question
that confounds negotiation scholarship, negotiation teaching, and negotiations
themselves:  How much are we alike and how much do we differ?22  Scholars,
including Shapiro, Fisher, Ury, and Patton (the latter three being co-authors of
the second edition of Getting to Yes), cite both contemporary psychology and
ancient Buddhism for the idea that “we” are very much the same.
Riskin borrows contemporary social psychology’s creed and accepts the
theory of fundamental attribution error.  Under this theory, we all tend to blame
others’ behavior on the individual failures of those individuals, even though we
all would act the same in similar circumstances.23  To paraphrase a famous
social psychology text, it is the situation and not the person.24  So, too, Bud-
dhism is often thought to teach the idea of non-self.25  We have no abiding self;
“our” actions merely reflect the consequences of many impersonal
conditions.26
Although the core concerns approach may help solve many dilemmas and
conflicts, this Article also offers other guides both to test whether the core
concerns really do facilitate more productive emotions, or otherwise facilitate
21 In Buddhist psychology, these are the separate practices of initial attention, vicaca, and
sustained attention, viccara.  For an accessible guide to stages of concentration in meditation
practice, see generally SHALIA CATHERINE, FOCUSED AND FEARLESS:  A MEDITATOR’S
GUIDE TO STATES OF DEEP JOY, CALM AND CLARITY (2008).
22 Compare G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE 3 (2d ed. 2006) (suggesting
that negotiators understand their typical approach, such as competitive, cooperative, avoi-
dant, etc., and “bake with the flour [they] have”), with Freshman, External Mindfulness,
Negotiation, and Lie Detection, supra note 2 (noting that a fixed negotiator personality is
largely a myth and individuals often negotiate differently in different contexts), Freshman,
Emotion, Identity, and Negotiation Success, supra note 1 (explaining that notions of negotia-
tor personality clash with insights from both social psychology, which suggests context mat-
ters more than individual differences, and postmodernism, which suggests that contemporary
society includes many shifting identities), and Sheila Heen & John Richardson, I See a
Pattern Here and the Pattern Is You:  Personality and Dispute Resolution, in HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 1, at 35, 47–48 (expressing skepticism about how well
personality tests can predict behavior but suggesting that they may be helpful for recognizing
patterns in oneself and others).
23 Riskin, supra note 1, at 305 (citing fundamental attribution error).  For more on funda-
mental attribution error in general, see LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND
THE SITUATION (1991).
24 ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 23, at 4.
25 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 140-42.
26 For more information on impersonality, see, for example, id. But see B. Alan Wallace, A
Buddhist View of Free Will:  Beyond Determinism and Indeterminism, in NEUROSCIENCES
AND FREE WILL 59, 61 (Robert Pollack ed., 2009), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/
cssr/ebook/FreeWill_eBook.pdf (“Buddhism asserts a measure of free will insofar as one can
reflect on one’s options and decide on the best course of action in terms [of] its moral
suitability.”).
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better solutions, and other tools to themselves optimize emotions and/or solu-
tions.  (I say better solutions “and/or” emotions because, while optimal emo-
tions may often reveal solutions that are “better” from some perspective, or
perspectives, the two sometimes diverge.27)  Part I evaluates Riskin’s argument
that emotions are too difficult to address individually and concludes that much
scientific evidence does not support this claim.  For one, evidence demonstrates
that it is relatively easy to identify and distinguish particular emotions.28  In
particular, many researchers believe many emotions are largely the same across
different cultures.29  In addition, studies have shown that almost anyone can
markedly improve her or his ability to identify such emotions in less than an
hour of training, even those with what we often think of as psychological
disabilities.30
Part II introduces “external mindfulness,” a variation on Riskin’s mindful-
ness approach.  Through external mindfulness, parties learn to recognize the
predictable physical signs of particular emotions, both in other peoples’ faces
and in their own physiological responses.  These physical and physiological
signals can then help parties determine whether their appeals to the core con-
cerns make emotions better, make no difference, or even make them worse.  In
this way, external mindfulness complements the core concerns approach while
safeguarding parties from the approach’s limitations.
Indeed, one significant limitation is that the core concerns may not be
nearly so core.  Imagine that Jack read Shapiro and Fisher’s suggestion31 that
he should invite Phil to brainstorm.  Jack would expect that gesture at affilia-
tion—one of Shapiro and Fisher’s “core concerns”32—to tame Phil’s negative
emotions and engender positive ones.  It might work, but it might not.  As I
suggest below in Part III, we should expect such “surprise” failures in some
instances and, too, some remarkable successes in others.  Although different
individuals may respond in different ways to the same tactics, the problems
often lie with the nature of some of the core concerns concepts, specifically
27 Because women may feel better when they fit expectations of being less assertive than
men, they may feel better when they “don’t ask” for more in a negotiation, such as a better
first year salary. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK:  NEGOTIATION
AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 123 (2008).  But this failure to ask may result in a lower salary
and, combined over a lifetime of raises based in large part on starting salaries, much less
money.  In the future, this lower salary may haunt these women, contribute to lesser salaries
for other women, and hurt those for whom the women otherwise may care.  I say “may”
deliberately since there is conflicting evidence on when higher salaries and wealth lead to
greater happiness. Compare DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2007) (arguing
that money is associated with greater happiness), with MARTIN SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAP-
PINESS:  USING THE NEW POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING
FULFILLMENT (2004) (citing research that, past a certain point, money is not associated with
greater happiness).  To take a second general complication, theorists often say identifying
more options will make possible better solutions. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 7.
But some recent research suggests that some people, particularly maximizers who want the
very best, feel worse when they experience “choice overload.” See Chris Guthrie, Panacea
or Pandora’s Box?  The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 635 (2003).
28 See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
29 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
31 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 79.
32 Id. at 52-54.
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affiliation and autonomy.  Research suggests that these core concerns may be
core for some individuals, but not for others.  Indeed, there may be a cultural
component to this in that some cultures may prioritize some of the core con-
cerns more than others.
I. IS IT POSSIBLE TO TEACH PEOPLE TO RECOGNIZE DISTINCT EMOTIONS?
Before we compare different strategies to work with emotions—direct vs.
indirect, core concerns and mindfulness vs. other approaches—it is worth
reviewing how emotions affect negotiation.  Elsewhere, I have contrasted the
folklore on emotion with the conclusions of modern science and research.33
The folklore approach comes from “insights” and “expertise” and “wisdom”
that practitioners and scholars believe and teach.  As in diverse disciplines, this
received “wisdom” turns out to have little or no support in serious study.34  On
the one hand, folklore makes several limiting assumptions:
• Negative emotions, particularly anger, affect negotiation. Riskin’s article and the
book by Shapiro and Fisher both say that both positive and negative emotions
matter, but both devote more time to arguably negative emotions.  Riskin, for
example, uses the word “problem” to describe emotions rather than, say,
“problems and possibilities.”35
• Emotions that affect negotiation are primarily strong ones.  These strong, negative
emotions are often responses to “difficult” people.  Alas, this perspective often
opens the door to difficult distorted perceptions and stereotyping of unwanted
behavior demonstrated by disfavored groups often labeled as “too emotional,”
such as women, African-Americans, Latinas and Latinos, and bisexuals, lesbians,
and gay men.36
33 See Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist, supra note 1, at 7.
34 Clark Freshman, Were Patricia Williams and Donald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1568, 1577-79 (1995) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
(1995), with a reply by Posner).  Personal trainers often tell those of us who exercise that we
should “cool down” after exercising—some say by stretching and others say by doing a
slower or otherwise less intense version of the exercise.  These experts posit many explana-
tions, but, alas, there turns out to be no evidence to support them.  Gina Kolata, Is the
Exercise Cool-Down Really Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, at E1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/health/nutrition/15best.html.  Indeed, there is reason to
believe that cooling down may even diminish the benefits of exercise! Id.
35 Riskin, supra note 1, at 294; FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 4-8 (stating that positive
and negative emotions both matter does not mean they will matter equally).  In my own
research on positive and negative mood, I found that both had independent explanatory
power.  Freshman et al., Efficient Emotion, supra note 1, at 19.
36 I list particular groups deliberately since the relevant stereotyping of others as too emo-
tional applies to some groups but not others; indeed, Asians may be stereotyped as too
unemotional.  Of course, I may be ignorant of the way that other groups also face stereotypes
of being too emotional or angry, and I welcome correspondence on this point. See Fresh-
man, supra note 34, at 1591.
By this two-punch pathologizing and competency questioning, Posner does not hear what outsid-
ers [such as women or people of color] say, and apparently cannot even read what they write.
One listens, if at all, to the pathological and the incompetent only to diagnose their condition, not
to consider their arguments.  This is hardly an adequate means to fulfill Posner’s professed
pragmatic project:  to ‘keep debate going and inquiry open’ (p.6).  The approach instead reminds
one of the patterns of pathologizing that often obscure those outside preferred groups.
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A principal way to deal with these strong, negative emotions from difficult
people is to “cool” them out.37  (“Them” may be either, or both, the difficult
emotions or the outsiders who tend to get labeled as too difficult.)
In contrast to this folklore approach to negotiation, I have proposed a sci-
ence of emotional efficiency based on recent negotiation studies38:
• Positive emotions are not merely the absence of negative emotions (“not too
bad”) but distinct emotions (“feeling great”) that independently affect
negotiation.39
• Even mild emotions (for example, a kick from chocolate or a pleasant scent)
affect negotiation.40
• Even mild emotions have an effect on otherwise mentally healthy people.41
• Negotiators should try to develop positive emotions and better manage negative
emotions because a more positive and less negative mix of emotions typically
leads to better negotiation outcomes.42
Id. (emphasis in original).  For discussion of the way that the same behavior may be
labeled—and even sincerely experienced—as assertive if from a man but bitchy if from a
woman, see generally Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination:  Use of Acts
of Discrimination Against “Other” Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under
Federal Employment Law, 43 STAN. L. REV. 241, 242 & n.3 (1990).  For the way women
themselves may internalize such notions, see BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 27, at 87;
LAURA KRAY & LINDA BABCOCK, Gender in Negotiations:  A Motivated Social Cognitive
Analysis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 201, 208 (Leigh Thompson ed., 2006)
(asserting that women may be more concerned about creating a good impression in negotia-
tion because they are expected to be more “communally oriented” and identifying research
that suggests this may perception may be well founded as women who were self-promoting
in interviews were viewed as less likeable).
37 Riskin, supra note 1, at 307 (cooling out negative emotions); FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra
note 3, at 150-52 (providing examples of how to cool out negative emotions).  For a more
exhaustive survey of this prevalent view, see Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood
Scientist, supra note 1, at 66-67.
38 Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist, supra note 1.
39 Id. at 12.
40 Id. at 12-14.
41 Id.
42 I laid out a preliminary synthesis of what was then the state of the art on emotion and
negotiation research in Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist, supra note 1.
Since then, my own research has changed. See Freshman et al., Efficient Emotion, supra
note 1.  Although I previously saw negative emotions as inefficient, more recent research has
persuaded me that negative emotions such as anger may sometimes lead to better outcomes.
Some go so far as to suggest that emotions should not be seen as negative or positive in
general but as helpful or less helpful in particular contexts. See DALAI LAMA & PAUL
EKMAN, EMOTIONAL AWARENESS:  OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES TO PSYCHOLOGICAL BAL-
ANCE AND COMPASSION 17-29 (Paul Ekman ed., 2008). This empirical finding and other
theoretical accounts persuade me that one might treat emotions as generally positive and
generally negative or generally efficient and generally inefficient. Cf. Bruce Barry, Ingrid
Smithey Fulmer & Nathan Goates, Bargaining with Feeling:  Emotionality in and Around
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH, supra note 36, at 99, 105 (summariz-
ing decades of research on the effect of emotion on negotiation and concluding that “positive
affect contributes to cooperative behavior and negative affect disrupts it, notwithstanding
evidence that certain manifestations of affect, in certain contexts, yield an opposite
conclusion”).
It is less clear to me what this means for my own negotiations and for teaching negotia-
tion.  First and foremost, the studies showing that positive emotions are associated with
better outcomes are vast and replicated by different scholars over decades; however, the
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Given this importance of emotions, Riskin’s sympathetic reference to Sha-
piro and Fisher’s claims that it would be too “daunting” to become aware of the
“many” emotions43 merits a closer look.  Before accepting this argument, we
should consider questions such as:  Can one learn to improve awareness of his
or her own emotions and the emotions of others?  What are the benefits and
costs of learning this kind of awareness?  And, of course, how do these costs
and benefits of learning emotional awareness compare with the costs and bene-
fits of learning how to work with the core concerns?  (Of course, it need not be
a competition:  I urge every negotiator to learn both the core concerns and
external mindfulness.)
The simplest answer is that clear, scientific evidence demonstrates most
individuals can improve emotional awareness with an hour of training.44  As
Shapiro and Fisher acknowledge, there are many definitions of emotion.45  If
suggestions that negative emotions, for example anger, are sometimes associated with better
outcomes are either purely speculative and anecdotal or confined to a few very recent studies
by a few scholars.  Second, even if the theories and this embryonic research are correct that
emotions differ with context, the question remains who, if anyone, may distinguish the
minority of cases when generally negative emotions have a useful effect.  Consider, for
example, Allred’s careful study of anger and negotiation.  Keith G. Allred et al., The Influ-
ence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 175, 181 n.2 (1997).  There, he induced anger by giving con-
flicting information to two sides of a job negotiation.  Those playing employers were led to
believe the applicant did not really care about computers, and the employee was led to
believe exactly the opposite: that computers were an important marker of the employee’s
status.  Both, therefore, might have felt “justified” in displaying “anger”—and viewed the
anger of the other as simply illegitimate!
My initial inclination is to believe that disentangling the minority of cases of useful
anger from destructive anger may be akin to the problem of picking stocks rather than buy-
ing diverse index funds:  it is possible for managers to beat the market.  But, like using anger
strategically, beating the market involves several distinct decisions—picking the time to go
into a stock, picking the stock to go into, and picking the time to get out.  In addition to these
analytic problems, there are the problems of herd mentality, loss aversion, and other cogni-
tive and emotional biases.  For general introductions to the problem of such cognitive errors
for investment choices, see, for example, MAX H. BAZERMAN, SMART MONEY DECISIONS 3
(2001), and JASON ZWEIG, YOUR MONEY AND YOUR BRAIN:  BECOME A SMARTER, MORE
SUCCESSFUL INVESTOR (2007).  No wonder empirical research suggests that few manage to
beat the stock market consistently over time. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RAN-
DOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1973).  I suspect time may show that only an analogous
small number of negotiators can manage to use anger effectively.
On the other hand, to the extent one does want to distinguish the times when anger and
other negative emotions may be efficient, this requires careful attention to the effects rather
than relying on the generic strategy suggested by the core concerns.
43
“They [Fisher & Shapiro] assert that, during some negotiations, so many emotions are at
work that negotiators are often unable to attend to and address them directly.  So they pro-
pose a method for dealing with emotions in negotiation indirectly.”  Riskin, supra note 1, at
292.  “Fisher and Shapiro believe that negotiators are influenced by too many emotions to
notice and address directly [and therefore suggest focusing on the core concerns instead].”
Id. at 299.
44 M.G. Frank et al., Improving the Ability to Recognize Micro Expressions of Emotion
(2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
45 Definitions of “emotion” are rather diverse. See, e.g., FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY:  NEGOTIATION (A. Kruglanski & J. Forgas eds., 2006) (positing that there are more than
250 theories regarding the psychology of emotion); see also SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 415 (2d ed. 1991).  These definitions are also subject to revi-
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one adopts a broad definition that includes hundreds of distinct emotions, then
it is easy to understand why Shapiro and Fisher assume it is harder to recognize
these distinct emotions rather than the five core concerns they identify. Fortu-
nately, however, under one widely-accepted definition, there are seven univer-
sal emotions.46  According to Paul Ekman, a leading pioneer in the scientific
study of emotion,47 these basic emotions are happiness, surprise, fear, anger,
sadness, contempt, and disgust.48  Decades of research by Ekman and others
show these emotions exist in countries as diverse as the United States, Japan,
and Papa New Guinea, among others.49
Furthermore, people display these seven basic emotions in distinct facial
expressions, which people can easily learn to recognize.50  For example, con-
tempt or scorn reveals itself by a distinctive half smile on one side of the face.51
According to one study, people recognize such pattern expressions better after
just one hour by using Ekman’s microexpression training tool.52  This training
tool involves a pretest where participants identified quick changes in expres-
sion—between 1/5 and 1/30 of a second—as one of the seven basic emotions.
Next, the tool shows examples of each basic emotion while Ekman narrates
how to recognize and distinguish between often confused emotions, such as
surprise and fear.  Users then practice with another set of fast expressions and
got feedback on the expression they identify correctly.  On practice examples,
users also could freeze the image to see the emotion at its peak.  Users can
review more videos, again narrated by Ekman, reviewing key emotions before
finally taking a posttest.53
This simple method works and may be quite useful in negotiation.  One
study shows that persons diagnosed with schizophrenia improve to a normal
level after this one-hour training;54 another study shows similar results for peo-
sion.  Paul Ekman, for example, has been rather limited in what he would count as an emo-
tion but recently has expanded that definition. PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED 190 (2d
ed. 2007) (entertaining the possibility that there may be distinct pleasant emotions).
46 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 10-14.
47 Ekman was named one of the 100 most influential scientists of the twentieth century by
Time magazine.  Time 100, TIME, May 11, 2009, at 35; see also Jill Bolte Taylor, The 2009
TIME 100:  Scientists & Thinkers—Paul Ekman, TIME.COM, Apr. 30, 2009, http://
www.time.com (search “Time.com” for “Paul Ekman”; then follow “Paul Ekman – The
2009 Time 100” hyperlink).
48 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 10-14.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 183-86.  Picture Dick Cheney!  If you did, you might want to review the list of
ways to defuse negative emotion outlined by Shapiro and Fisher. See FISHER & SHAPIRO,
supra note 3, at 150-52.
52 Ekman’s microexpression training tool is available at F.A.C.E. Training—Products, http:/
/face.paulekman.com/products.aspx (last visited June 5, 2010). For more information on
Ekman’s study, see generally PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES (2d ed. 2009).  Other resources on
improving emotional awareness also exist.  For a recent example of a computer tool devel-
oped specifically for autistic children, see The Transporters, http://www.thetransporters.com
(last visited June 5, 2010).
53 For a description of the online version of the tool, see F.A.C.E. Training—Products,
supra note 52.
54 See EKMAN, supra note 52, at 352.
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ple with autism.55  It is plausible that people without such disabilities may learn
even more quickly.  Moreover, both these studies looked only at very quick
expressions of emotions, expressions of 1/5 to 1/30 of a second, which Ekman
calls “microexpressions.”56  Ekman associates microexpressions with con-
cealed emotions, the kind a person either displays unconsciously or wishes to
conceal from others.57  Such microexpressions may be particularly useful for
negotiation because they can indicate deception, and negotiators often want to
know when others are lying.58
At the same time, awareness of longer expressions of emotion also may be
helpful to negotiators and easier to recognize than such fleeting microexpres-
sions.  Furthermore, the microexpression research depends on persons recog-
nizing a single fast expression out of context.  In a real life encounter,
negotiation or otherwise, a person may express an emotion multiple times and
in conjunction with other clues, such as changes in voice or body language.
Because the microexpression training tool shows awareness of these same
facial patterns—only at breakneck speed—they should a fortiori improve rec-
ognition of the macro expressions that people leave on their faces for longer
times—like Dick Cheney’s lingering contempt.  Finally, a separate training tool
by Ekman shows how to recognize subtle expressions, the movements of only
some of the muscles associated with an emotion.59  Research shows training in
these subtle expressions of emotions is associated with greater accuracy in
spotting lies.60
II. IF WE COULD DETECT DISTINCT EMOTIONS, HOW WOULD THAT
HELP NEGOTIATION?
Although we know with scientific precision that most can indeed identify
specific emotions at the very low cost of one hour, the question still remains:
How does external awareness of emotion benefit negotiation?  As yet, I know
of no studies that test specifically whether those trained in external mindfulness
55 M.G. Frank et al., supra note 44.
56 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 214-16.
57 Id.
58 M.G. Frank et al., supra note 44.
59 See F.A.C.E. Training—Products, supra note 52.
60 Gemma Warren, Elizabeth Schertier & Peter Bull, Detecting Deception from Emotional
and Unemotional Cues, 33 J. NONVERBAL BEH. 59, 59-69 (2009).  The study showed that
training in microexpressions also tended to be associated with an improvement in recogniz-
ing lies.  The finding on microexpressions did not reach statistical significance, however.  In
other words, under generally accepted scientific principles of statistics, there was an unac-
ceptably high chance that the results on microexpressions could come from chance.  Paul
Ekman believes that the study suffers from two flaws that may understate the significance of
microexpressions for detecting lies.  First, the study included a small number of people, and
a larger study may well have included enough people that the findings would become statis-
tically significant.  Interview with Paul Ekman, Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, Univ. of
Cal., S.F., Sch. of Med., in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 2009).  Second, the study did not use a regression
analysis to test whether the training in microexpressions had a benefit above and beyond the
training in subtle expressions. Id.  In contrast, my own research on emotions and negotiation
used a regression analysis to show that both positive and negative emotion have an indepen-
dent association with negotiation outcomes.  Freshman et al, Efficient Emotion, supra note
1.
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of emotion do better at negotiation.  That’s not so bad:  there’s not very much
study to see whether any particular technique of teaching negotiation actually
works!61  However, such research would be easy enough to construct, and I
hope to do so.  In the meantime, my experience and discussion with negotiation
teachers and negotiators at trainings across the United States and Europe sug-
gests several ways it helps.
To begin with, once we know how to spot even concealed emotions, we
can learn much about such things as our potential leverage and standards or
threats62 that may work with a given person.  For instance, when looking at
apartments to rent, I stopped by an open house, with no other potential tenants
in sight.  “Not many people here today,” I said to the apartment’s owner, not
knowing whether I was late or whether there simply was not high demand.  As
I looked at the owner’s face, she showed a quick expression of fear, a move-
ment of one set of muscles that draws her inner eyebrows up.63  Instantly I
thought:  maybe I can get this place for less!  (I say maybe because all I knew
for sure was that she had the emotion, not necessarily why, nor how long that
emotion would last, nor how much she would believe whatever triggered that
emotion at that time.)
This experience mirrors the results of simulated real estate negotiations
that Harvard Business School Professor Michael Wheeler and I developed from
a research study.64  In each negotiation, an actor played a potential buyer of
medical office space, which he hoped to purchase and lease to doctors.  In
several videos, some negotiators in the study “selling” showed similar fleeting
expressions of fear on their face when the actor made certain arguments or
questioned their other offers.  In one video, however, the counterpart showed
multiple expressions of contempt through both facial expressions and body lan-
guage.  Even without knowing whether the subjects were lying, the knowledge
of the emotions alone may improve negotiation.  When negotiators see fear,
they may not know if the person is lying, but they can make a decent hypothe-
sis that their argument is working or that the person really is anxious to make a
deal.
Also, external mindfulness of emotion may allow a negotiator to recognize
a lack of positive emotion or an emerging negative emotion that could benefit
from attention to the core concerns.  For example, Jack may notice that Phil’s
61 Research does support some particular teaching methods. See, e.g., BABCOCK & LAS-
CHEVER, supra note 27, at 132 (teaching people to set higher goals); HALLAM  MOVIUS &
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, BUILT TO WIN 13-24 (2009) (discussing reasons why negotiation
training may often not improve negotiation results and particularly criticizing the way that
institutions may not support changes in the way people negotiate); James J. Gillespie et al.,
Lessons from Analogical Reasoning in the Teaching of Negotiation, 15 NEGOTIATION J. 363,
363-71 (Oct. 1999) (pointing out the analogy between a past simulated negotiation and a
new one).
62 What words and demeanor are interpreted by which people as “threats” rather than “stan-
dards” is not clear. GETTING TO YES counsels that one can resolve disputes by looking at,
among other things, what a court would do. FISHER & URY, supra note 7.  Yet Thompson
reminds us what any lawyer knows:  what is heard as a threat may also provoke a negative
reaction and lead people to exit negotiations. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 118.
63 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 164.
64 Research notes and videos are on file with author.  The pilot research is not published but
is used in trainings conducted by Wheeler and me.
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face has not been expressing happiness;65 instead, Phil has been thinning his
lips, slightly drawing down his eyebrows, and widening his eyelids—in short,
displaying the signs of emerging anger.66  As we saw, Jack knows that even
mild anger may make Phil see issues more narrowly, think less creatively to
find a solution, and increase his likelihood to lie and make threats.67  Thus,
Jack wants to take advantage of this early warning sign, a kind of opportunity
that the Dalai Lama calls the “spark before the flame.”68
Similarly, external mindfulness also helps to test whether a given attempt
to manage emotion actually works.  Following the classic suggestion from Get-
ting to Yes,69 suppose Jack suggests that he and Phil brainstorm some solu-
tions.  Perhaps Jack notices a subtle smile emerging in Phil’s face or a change
in his voice.  Success!  He may continue in this path.  Instead, suppose Jack
notices that Phil shows a quick half smile on one side of his face, an expression
associated with contempt.  Jack might respond by asking Phil what he thinks of
the idea, asking Phil for a suggestion, or normalizing Phil’s reaction by sug-
gesting that negotiation like this can often bring up difficult emotions.70
Indeed, if we negotiators and negotiation teachers practiced this external
mindfulness check, we would notice that some “conventional wisdom” about
emotional management actually fails.  For example, Getting to Yes itself sug-
gests that parties might take turns venting emotion.  Although there are concep-
tual problems in testing, research now suggests that venting may simply lead to
more anger.71  Likewise, conventional wisdom posits that active listening, such
as saying “I hear what you’re saying,” lets speakers know they are heard.72  Yet
more recent research on couples suggests such active listening does not work so
well.73  When I say classic active listening phrases such as “I hear what you’re
saying” with my sister, she tells me to “Stop that psychobabble!” In short,
then, training in awareness of specific emotions is possible.  And such training
is likely to be useful.  Contrary to the assertions that recognizing emotions is
65 Daniel S. Messinger, Alan Fogel & K. Laurie Dickson, All Smiles Are Positive, but Some
Smiles Are More Positive than Others, in WHAT THE FACE REVEALS 328, 328-29 (Paul
Ekman & Erika L. Rosenberg eds., 2d ed. 2005) (distinguishing mere social smiles from
smiles that are genuine but weak or genuine and strong).
66 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 139-40.
67 Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist, supra note 1, at 12-14.
68 DALAI LAMA & EKMAN, supra note 42, at 23.
69 FISHER & URY, supra note 7, at 60.
70 Although Ekman has decades of research to show that one may recognize emotions, it is
less clear how one responds to this recognition.  He suggests a range of responses in EMO-
TIONS REVEALED, but there is no evidence cited that these methods work. See generally
EKMAN, supra note 45.
71 See, e.g., FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 157; FISHER & URY, supra note 7, at 31;
Freshman et al., Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist, supra note 1, at 69.
72 John Barkai, Teaching Negotiation and ADR:  The Savvy Samurai Meets the Devil, 75
NEB. L. REV. 704, 741-42 (1996) (claiming that active listening is easy to learn, self-cor-
rects, and helps negotiation).
73 One of the foremost scientists of what actually works in couples therapy, John Gottman
can predict whether couples will separate based on observing a fifteen minute conversation.
He is strongly critical of the notion that active listening will work in any conversation, let
alone in heated conversations between couples. See JOHN GOTTMAN, THE MARRIAGE CLINIC
9 (1999) (concluding that “active listening exchanges hardly ever occurred, and they pre-
dicted nothing” in many conversations between couples).
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difficult, such external mindfulness is trainable at low cost and promises signif-
icant benefits.
As useful as learning to recognize emotion may be, caveats exist.  First,
although research suggests most people improve their ability to recognize emo-
tion in half an hour, not everyone does so.  Some people are so good in the
beginning that ceiling effects apply, and they do not improve.74  Others just
show an insensitivity to emotion that defies the studied training.75  Nonethe-
less, the benefits and costs of learning distinct emotions suggest it is a valuable
investment.
III. WHY CORE CONCERNS OFTEN FAIL OR BACKFIRE AND HOW EXTERNAL
MINDFULNESS HELPS
At this point, I am tempted to end my discussion with a familiar gesture to
the “Yes, and . . . ?” perspective:  Awareness of emotion may enhance work
with the core concerns.76  Instead, I make a stronger claim:  Awareness of emo-
tion is a crucial tool to complement the core concerns.  Indeed, attending to the
core concerns will often not work and may even make difficult negotiations
worse for several reasons.  First, the core concerns approach does not consider
the effects of emotions that parties may experience from sources other than the
negotiation itself.77  As my real-time reflection below in the middle of writing
this illustrates, emotions, whatever their cause, can influence people.  Second,
the core concerns may not be universal.  Specifically, personality differences
and cultural variation may lead people to react differently to the core concerns.
A. Real Time Reflection to Illustrate How Emotion Affects My Analysis
Before I go on to explain why the core concerns often fail or even back-
fire, I want to share a little mindfulness to reinforce how emotion affects cogni-
tion.  As I wrote the last paragraph, I was aware of my face hardening.  In
contrast, when I wrote earlier about how core concerns and emotional aware-
ness could complement each other, I noticed a subtle elasticity in my face and a
lightness in my body.  If I had filmed myself writing,78 I could have checked
for subtle activity in my facial muscles associated with sincere happiness.  As I
was just writing, however, I noticed a change in my breathing.  The area where
74 New tools developed by Paul Ekman aim to improve recognition by using more examples
as well as more difficult examples—namely profile shots!  Visit www.paulekman.com for
more information.
75 I often invite friends to trainings, and most improve.  I was particularly excited to invite
two of my closest friends, both of whom often make insensitive comments and fail to offer
encouragement.  I was not surprised when both scored quite low on the pretest.  More disap-
pointingly, they both scored poorly on the post-test as well.  At least I now know not to take
their insensitivity personally; they simply cannot notice how they affect me and others!
76 For further discussion of the “yes and” perspective, see generally DOUGLAS STONE ET AL.,
DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS (1999).
77 Dan Shapiro first discussed his perception that my work focused on emotions, whatever
their source, whereas his research focused on emotions from within the negotiation context
when he and I presented a joint program several years ago.
78 Why not, with my Mac?
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my abdomen meets my lower ribs felt a bit stuck, and I detected my breaths
becoming a bit shorter and my vision turning a bit blurry.
As I am writing now, I have just gotten often the phone with a close friend
who has been suffering from depression.  A few weeks ago, she asked my opin-
ion about raising her antidepressant dose, which her oncologist had prescribed
six years ago.  I suggested that she see a psychiatrist, and it was quite difficult
these few weeks.  She wanted just to ask her doctor for a higher dose of the
same antidepressant, but I knew from my research and my own experience that
psychiatrists often got better results.  And, depression being depression, it
sometimes manifested as anger—even anger directed at me for my sugges-
tions.79  Hearing her on the phone just now, she sounded encouraged after see-
ing a psychiatrist to remedy some side effects.  In between this writing and
talking, I also texted a real estate agent about buying my first home.
What do I make of this?  My physical signs, noted above, indicate low-
grade fear.80  As with any emotion, I do not know exactly why this fear arose.
Perhaps I was afraid that my friends Len (Riskin) and Dan (Shapiro) would
take my skepticism personally.  Maybe I was fearful about my first real estate
purchase.  It is possible that my fear was unrelated to any specific content but
was a kind of negative emotion and thinking that may arise on its own in those
who suffer from multiple episodes of depression.81
As I became aware of my fear, another question arose:  Would the fear
make me see things in a more adversarial way as I write and cause me to
exaggerate the conflict between core concerns and emotion?  Would I act need-
lessly competitive and suggest that my friends’ approach is inferior to my own?
As I write this, I feel a certain pre-smile on my face, and my breath feels
less constrained.  The mindfulness alone may have done this, and no additional
intervention may be required.  Nonetheless, like Riskin, Fisher, and Shapiro
suggest,82 I also decide it is time to take a break because there are “strong
negative emotions.”83  Yet my case is different; I follow a different model of
emotion and pause once I begin to feel even these slight, impending negative
emotions.  Starting my writing again tomorrow, I will likely have many posi-
79 Compare TERRENCE REAL, I DON’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT:  OVERCOMING THE
SECRET LEGACY OF MALE DEPRESSION (1998) (suggesting that men with symptoms of
depression often display anger), with Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and Getting Your
Way:  Mood Effects on Negotiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 565, 568 (1998) (showing that those induced to be in even mildly negative mood
by criticism of how they handled a test were more likely to engage in threats during
negotiations).
80 EKMAN, supra note 45, at 164.
81 For additional discussion of autonomous depression, see, for example, ZINDEL V. SEGAL
ET AL., MINDFULNESS-BASED COGNITIVE THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION:  A NEW APPROACH TO
PREVENTING RELAPSE (2002) (noting that mindfulness-based therapy seemed to work only
for those with multiple episodes of depression and theorizing such persons are more likely to
have autonomous depression that arises on its own rather than in response to any specific
stressor).
82 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 153.
83 Leonard Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer:  On the Potential Contributions of Mindful-
ness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEG.  L. REV. 1, 30
n.126 (2002) (writing a mindfulness article, Riskin spilled his coffee—twice).
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tive emotions after I return from taking my dog84 to the dog park, especially if
it is a sunny day.85
A lesson emerges here:  Emotion, whatever its source, may influence cog-
nition and action.  In contrast, the core concerns approach focuses primarily on
the negotiation itself as a source of emotion.86  While my “negotiation” with
the writing of my friends, Len and Dan, may have produced my fearful emo-
tions, these emotions also could have been a reaction to my friend’s depression
or my impending house purchase.87  I could have attempted to change my emo-
tion through affiliation—reminding myself that Dan and I did trainings
together, that Dan attended a day long training I gave at Harvard Business
School, that Len suggested my name for a conference at Harvard, a law profes-
sor’s convention, this very symposium, and for my first meditation retreat,
which led to other retreats and practices that have brought me (and those who
encounter me) much joy!  But I also could have changed my emotion by play-
ing with my dog or by learning the good news from my friend with depression.
With that example in mind, notice the many roles for external awareness
of particular emotions, even quite mild ones.  Imagine if Roger, Dan, Len, and I
were negotiating over how to write a book together.  They might prepare by
reminding me how nice it has been to work together (affiliation), asking what
topics I think we might address (autonomy), and so on.  But that framework
leaves them unprepared to notice the mild negative emotion I experienced at
my house.88  Instead, my mild negative emotion might affect them mildly,89
and they, too, might become more competitive than necessary.  Indeed, my
friends may become even more competitive when I fail to react positively to
their careful preparation and attention to the “universal” core concerns.
84 On companion animals and depression, see, for example, Rachel Gordon, ‘Assistance
Dog’ Designation Opens Doors for Pooches, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2004, at A-1. See also
Joan Esnayra, Help from Man’s Best Friend:  Psychiatric Service Dogs Are Helping Con-
sumers Deal with the Symptoms of Mental Illness, 27 BEHAV. HEALTHCARE 30-32 (2007)
(regarding dogs for depression as service animals under the law); WebMD, The Pet Prescrip-
tion:  Is It for You?, http://www.webmd.com/balance/features/pet-prescription-is-for-you
(last visited June 5, 2010) (noting that studies have found owning a pet lowers stress,
relieves depression, reduces blood pressure and triglycerides, and improves exercise habits,
all of which can lower the risk of heart attacks).
85 See G.W. Lambert et al., Effect of Sunlight and Season on Serotonin Turnover in the
Brain, 360 LANCET 1840, 1840 (2002)  (“[T]he rate of production of serotonin by the brain
was directly related to the prevailing duration of bright sunlight (r=0.294, p=0.010), and rose
rapidly with increased luminosity.  Our findings are further evidence for the notion that
changes in release of serotonin by the brain underlie mood seasonality and seasonal affective
disorder.”); see also Michael R. Cunningham, Wealth, Mood and Helping Behavior:  Quasi-
Experiments in the Sunshine Samaritan, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1947 (1979).
86 I say primarily because the core concerns approach also offers tools like the break I was
just about to take when there are “strong negative emotions.”
87 Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 213, 213-18 (1967).
88 I did not get the house.  However, as I have decided the market still may be going down,
all is not lost.
89 For discussion on emotional contagions, see, for example, DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE:  THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (2006) (identifying the phe-
nomenon that occurs when one person has a negative emotion that leads those nearby to
develop the same negative emotion).
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B. Why Core Concerns May Backfire
Months after I wrote the reflection above, I think it shows two things.
First, we need to pay attention to all sources of emotion, not just those from
within the negotiation itself.  Core concerns instead work largely with the nego-
tiation and the relationship between the parties to the negotiation.
As I write this, I’m traveling in a luxurious business class seat on the way
back from a conference on negotiation teaching in Istanbul, and I’m feeling
fine.  Indeed, I’m feeling fine partly because the airline met a core concern:
they respected my autonomy by giving me the chance to upgrade to first class
for only $500, which made me feel good, even though I’m still “only” in busi-
ness.  Without the emotional “noise” I had at my last reflection—not just from
the business seat but also from my friend’s incredible success with the psychia-
trist I found for her—I can now be pretty sure it’s fair to say what follows.  As
my happiness with the offer alone of a first class seat shows, I really do believe
that some core concerns explain how I feel. And I still think the core concerns
approach ignores emotions external to the negotiation itself.
Second, the core concerns may not be as “universal” as proponents sug-
gest.  Indeed, the approach may backfire, exaggerating negative emotions and
dampening positive emotions.  I am not sure how to quantify this problem with
the core concerns approach:  just how often do they help and how often do they
hurt—and how often do they make no difference?  For now, I think it’s good
enough just to note that it’s plausible there are enough times that sometimes it’s
not useful to address a particular core concern, and sometimes it’s not useful to
address a core concern in a particular way.  Below, I illustrate the logical ways
in which the core concerns may not work as promised and how external mind-
fulness of emotion may help balance the shortcomings of the core concerns.
1. The Core Concerns May Not Be Universal
Core concerns may not apply to all negotiators for three sets of reasons:
(1) the general ways in which no single approach may apply to all people; (2)
the particular problems that the core concerns may trigger, such as resentment
at being patronized, and, (3) the people we encounter in negotiations, particu-
larly in the legal context.  Let’s return to Jack and Phil.  Maybe if Jack tries to
suggest brainstorming with Phil, then Phil will feel better from having his
autonomy respected.  But maybe Phil is very solution-oriented, and he may just
want to hear a proposal.  Worse, perhaps Phil will try brainstorming but get
frustrated because he is just a solution-oriented person.  And, if Phil’s lawyer is
involved, then, like many lawyers, he may be suspicious of sharing the infor-
mation needed to brainstorm.
The first-level problem of any generalized approach (rather than an indi-
vidualized approach) brings us to the core of social psychology’s claim that
peoples’ behavior depends on the situation in which they find themselves rather
than their personality.  Essentially, social psychology posits that seemingly
diverse people in the same situation will behave the same.  Indeed, there is a
significant body of research that supports the position.  For example, the Mil-
gram experiments demonstrated that while we generally think only “evil” peo-
ple would use electric shocks on innocents, a high percentage of diverse people
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were willing to follow orders from experimenters in white coats to do just
that.90  On a more positive note, Tom Tyler’s pioneering research found that
most people derive greater satisfaction from participating in a process like
mediation than from simply attaining the desired outcome.91  Likewise, social
psychologists note that mild interventions such as exposing people to pleasant
scents and giving them chocolate put people in a better mood and correlate to
better negotiation outcomes.92  These experiments all suggest that people share
some basic, “universal” characteristics.
Nonetheless, even most social psychologists agree that individuals differ
by certain personality characteristics. Some of you reading this may get
migraines from chocolate (God have mercy!); some of you, like me, may get
headaches from Glade and other “pleasantly” scented air fresheners.93  Such
logical distinctions and ad hoc statistics of exceptions might give us some
pause.  But the very social psychology that says most people will behave in
similar ways in similar situations is the same social psychology that has
decades of research to show that there are the “big five” distinctions in person-
ality, including how much people are prone to worry (“neuroticism”), how
much they pay attention to detail (“conscientious”), and how much they are
extroverted versus introverted.94
Some of these exact personality differences may doom the core concerns
approach in some situations with some people. Starting with affiliation, I might
respond well to Riskin’s reminder that we are both meditators devoted to pro-
moting meditation for lawyers and others.  However, social psychology finds
that some people are more introverted and others more extroverted.95  If I am
strongly introverted, then this attempt to draw me out on a personal level might
trigger negative emotions.
Notably, recent research suggests an important cultural twist.  It finds that
people from some countries, including the United States, are more likely to
say96 they are extroverted, while those from countries, such as France, fall
90 See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT (2007) (describing the Milgram
experiments and later similar research on why people may do bad things based on social and
institutional circumstances).
91 TYLER, supra note 9, at 151-52.  People may be more satisfied with participation in the
process, as in mediation, but this may be understood as false consciousness when this sense
of fulfillment leads them to settle for too little of their real needs. Id. at 111.
92 See generally Alice M. Isen, Andrew S. Rosenzweig & Mark J. Young, The Influence of
Positive Affect on Clinical Problem Solving, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 221 (1991).
93 MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/
000709.htm  (last visited June 5, 2010) (asserting that chocolate may trigger migraines); L.J.
Stovner et al., Epidemiology of Headache in Europe, 13 EUR. J. NEUROLOGY 333, 335
(2006) (stating that migraines will affect 12-27.5% of people at some point in their lives);
Diane Mapes, Odor Tyrants:  Those Sensitive to Scent Fight Back, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 31,
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23836093/ (describing a 2003 study of more than
10,000 mothers and their infants in England found air fresheners, deodorants and aerosols
were “significantly associated” with headaches in moms).
94 ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 23, at 93.
95 See, e.g., id.
96 I use the language “say they are” because the research relies on the way that people
answer questions.  This is not a fault of this particular set of research but a general limitation
of research in personality.  It is relatively quick and cheap to get people to answer surveys.
It is relatively hard to get people to agree to have researchers follow them around across
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somewhat in the middle, and those from countries, such as Indonesia, are much
more likely to be introverted.97  If Phil were from Indonesia, then, we might be
less surprised if we noticed negative emotions like anger or contempt or fear in
his face when Jack suggested brainstorming.98
In short, some personalities and/or those from certain cultures may warm
up to attention to core concerns, others may not react at all, and some may get
upset.  As I’ve said, I love brainstorming, and I love other attempts to respect
my autonomy, and I love the social process of brainstorming.  But many will
not.
2. The Example of Difficulty of Using the Core Concern of Affiliation
As with autonomy, if Phil tries to influence Jack through affiliation, that
also may work, do nothing, or backfire.  Affiliation refers to a person’s need to
feel included and connected.99  Just as I might have tried to improve my feel-
ings about Dan and Len by remembering how we were connected in many
common activities, or share common professional commitment, so, too, might
Phil or Jack.  In my case, however, different attempts at affiliation, however
well-intentioned, might trigger quite a range of emotions.  For example, if
someone introducing me referred to all meditators a “Buddhists,” this might
trigger a negative reaction in both me and those meditators who think of them-
selves as mere meditators, but not Buddhists—even if we meditate based on
principles shared with Buddhist teachings.100  There are enough individuals
who identify as meditators without any spiritual or religious affiliation—some
different activities and have the raters say what they think the people do!  Compare SHELL,
supra note 22, at 3-25, which asserts that people should negotiate in part according to their
type, as measured by, among other things, the Thomas-Kilman conflict resolution mode, but
the footnotes cite studies that observers often disagree with how participants describe their
negotiation style.
97 Robert R. McCrae et al., Personality Profiles of Cultures:  Aggregate Personality Traits,
89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 407, 420 fig.2 (2005).  Of course, it is worth noting
that this research relies on how individuals report their own preferences, and higher rates of
extroversion in the United States could, in part, reflect a desire to fit in with a culture that
values extroversion.  Subsequent research addressed this bias by asking people to rate some-
one they valued rather than themselves.  While addressing the concern, it still leaves open
the possibility that people from countries who value extroversion, like the United States,
may attribute socially desirable characteristics, such as extroversion, to those they like just as
they might attribute such characteristics to themselves.  Robert R. McCrae & Antonio Ter-
racciano, Universal Features of Personality Traits from the Observer’s Perspective:  Data
from 50 Cultures, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 547, 548 (2005).
98 I write this sentence with some trepidation:  I don’t want to suggest that negotiators
should engage in some type of ethnic profiling!  As I’ve written elsewhere, even if culture
matters, it’s hard to know what the relevant culture is.  Freshman, supra note 4, at 1694-95;
Clark Freshman, The Promise and Perils of “Our” Justice:  Psychological, Critical and
Economic Perspectives on Communities and Prejudices in Mediation, 6 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 1, 17 (2004).  When I was teaching lie detection to a US-owned engineering
firm based in Italy, they said they hated to hear how people in the Middle East like to
socialize before they negotiate.  “Those people are basically just engineers, and they want to
get down to business like the rest of us.”
99 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 53-54.
100 I say “shared with” advisedly since historians have shown how many meditation meth-
ods taught by the historical Buddha were in fact taught to him by other meditation masters of
his day. KAREN ARMSTRONG, BUDDHA 56-57 (2001) (describing how the historic Buddha
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days I subscribe to this view—that Jon Kabat-Zinn,101 a renowned meditation
expert, goes out of his way not to describe his program as Buddhist or even
spiritual.102  Or perhaps the offensiveness would lie not in invoking affiliation
by labeling one as a “meditator” or a “Buddhist,” but by invoking what some
well-intentioned person trying to build on affiliation would assume was a
shared Buddhist principle.  For example, many would cite abstention from
drinking as a Buddhist principle, but I think of it as just a historic artifact.103
Many, like Len and Dan, know me well enough not to invoke these kinds of
affiliations, but someone reading Dan’s book or Len’s article might very well.
Attempts at affiliation fail even if the person attempting to build on affilia-
tion is more right about who I am than I am.  For example, my reaction to
“meditator” or “Buddhist” could reflect some of what psychologists of discrim-
ination call “peripheral group discrimination.” As someone whose mindfulness
is on the margins of acceptance at my current law school, I might exaggerate
my differences with less accepted versions of mindfulness techniques, such as
avowedly “religious” ones, on faculties that I often find not receptive to relig-
ion.  Psychologists find this phenomenon among untenured faculty members
who dislike students more than tenured faculty members do, pledges who dis-
like rival fraternities more than the actual members of their fraternity do, and so
on.104  And, of course, we all know the words of Shylock, who rejected his
Venetian borrower’s attempts to socialize so poetically:105
Yes, to smell pork; to eat of the habitation which
your prophet the Nazarite conjured the devil into.  I
will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you,
walk with you, and so following, but I will not eat
with you, drink with you, nor pray with you. What
news on the Rialto? Who is he comes here?
learned common meditation methods of the day, such as concentrating on a single object,
whether his breath or a certain image).
101 Jon Kabat-Zinn has created a meditation program widely studied by scientists.  For a
review of the effectiveness of his programs and discussion of the numerous studies on its
effects on cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis, and other problems, see SHAUNA
L. SHAPIRO & LINDA E. CARLSON, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF MINDFULNESS:  INTEGRATING
MINDFULNESS INTO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 189 (2009).
102 See, e.g., JON KABAT-ZINN, WHEREVER YOU GO, THERE YOU ARE (2005); cf. SHARON
SALZBERG, FAITH:  TRUSTING YOUR OWN DEEPEST EXPERIENCE (2002) (explaining that she
does not agree with many beliefs often described as Buddhist though she is a renowned
teacher).
103 For information on abstention from drinking as a Buddhist principle, see, for example,
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 76.  Some people take the more moderate position that, if the
Buddha were “right” about many things, then one should consider his views about other
things as well.  In contrast, I agree with Shapiro and Fisher, who argue in general that we
may sometimes pay too much attention to people because they are experts in one area.
FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 108 (using “status spillover” to refer to “constant risk
that the opinions of a person who has high status . . . will be given undeserved weight on a
subject to which their status is irrelevant”).
104 Freshman, supra note 18, at 435-49 (discussing peripheral group discrimination); see
Jeffrey G. Noel et al., Peripheral Ingroup Membership Status and Public Negativity Toward
Outgroups, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 132-35 (1995).
105 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3 (Cornmarket Press
1971).
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And affiliation may not miss the mark by picking the wrong kind of affili-
ation.  We could conclude that Shylock doesn’t want to affiliate with non-Jews,
or maybe it is this particular non-Jew.  Since I wrote this, however, I learned
that—just as some people may be so introverted that they just don’t want to
brainstorm with anyone at any time—some people may be very sensitive to
false attempts at affiliation.  When I was in Istanbul at an international meeting
of negotiation teachers, the organizers had us visit the local market to bargain
over the price of something.  One woman was so upset that everyone tried to
bond with her and invoke some commonality that she asked me to write a piece
about the dangers of community and insincere attempts to invoke commu-
nity!106  (To further complicate things, as I’m revising this many months later, I
wonder if she invited me to write about the dangers of community in a crafty
way to build community with me!  And, as I revise this a few months even
later, I wonder if my lack of reply to various drafts of hers reflects an uncon-
scious resistance to being drawn into any community—even one based on
skepticism about community!)
And yet, it does make sense for us to consider the effects of affiliation,
perhaps most often when it will not succeed.  Research on discrimination
shows almost anything can be the basis for different treatment or discrimina-
tion.107  Then again, research also shows that what Shapiro and Fisher call
affiliation can sometimes be a potent antidote. At football stadiums, when
African-Americans ask a white fan for directions, they are much less likely to
receive help than white fans.108  But African-Americans who wears, say, a
Longhorns jackets is much more likely to get help from a white fan with
another Longhorns jacket than those who wear no jacket and ask for directions.
In core concerns language, something as simple as a jacket builds enough affili-
ation to overcome racism.
It is precisely because affiliation may work (as with a jacket) but also may
backfire (as with saying someone else and I are Buddhists) that we need exter-
nal mindfulness.  If someone who knows me refers to “we Buddhists,” or “we
meditators,” or our “commitment to truth,” he is making a decent bet because
affiliation often works, and those identities probably would resonate with most
meditators.  Again, compared to other negotiation approaches that make broad
claims—such as “set a high but reasonable first offer”—it may work much of
the time.109  Although it is a rather difficult distinction for most people to
106 Cf. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 132-36 (1996).  People may
object when something that is valuable in its pure form, such as the physical intimacy
between loved ones, is turned into a commercial transaction between what they might see as
“a trick” between a “John” and a “hooker.”  Though there may be much merit to arguments
that “sex workers” provide a valuable service to many, I use the language in the last sentence
to capture some of the heart and emotion behind the sentence that mere neutral language
might not capture.
107 See, e.g., Freshman, supra note 18, at 380 n.253 (citing Fiske for the proposition that
almost anything can become the basis for discrimination).
108 See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice:
The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in CONFRONTING RACISM:
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3, 27 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998).
109 On the general advice to set high offers, see, for example, THOMPSON, supra note 19, at
49 (noting that offers correlate highly with outcomes); SHELL, supra note 22, at 160.  Many,
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make, someone may improve his bet by trying to discern my reaction:  Do I
show a polite but insincere smile or some quick but readily identifiable nega-
tive emotion, such as disgust or anger?  As I noted above, it is not a hard skill
to acquire, and people can learn to improve their ability to identify universal
emotion.110
But Riskin and we mindful negotiators (I am pretty sure Riskin will like
that label) sometimes only need to distinguish if there is any negative emotion
to know when to pull back on an approach.  For example, if we want positive
emotion when we brainstorm because research shows it helps creativity,111 then
we only need to spot any negative emotion before we pull back.  This is even
easier than having to distinguish between particular emotions.112  If a negative
emotion exists, Riskin might then address a different core concern, take a dif-
ferent approach to promote positive emotion or dampen negative emotion (e.g.
calling a break), or try a different type of affiliation (e.g. “We writers have to
agree on something so those editors don’t get on our backs”).113  If his
approach is met with a genuine smile, Riskin might make similar allusions later
on to build more positive emotion and dampen negative emotion.  In this way,
external mindfulness can help parties to a negotiation tailor their attempts to
optimize emotion with a particular technique, whether invoking one affiliation
rather than another or trying a completely different tactic.
In other circumstances, of course, identifying the particular emotion would
be more useful.  If I offer a rent that is half of the asking price, I would want to
know if what I see is fear  (suggesting I might stick with my offer) or contempt
(suggesting I indeed may have triggered the feared chilling effect).  But this
same limitation applies to other negotiation advice and the core concerns them-
selves.  It is useful to know that one should aim “high but reasonable,” but it is
better if we could know the highest, reasonable price.  It is useful to know we
should invoke some affiliation, but it is more useful to know how we could get
the affiliation right.  And this underscores the promise—and the limitations—
of core concerns like affiliation.  Core concerns advocates say it is hard to
identify a particular emotion, but, as a logical matter, there is no reason to
assume it is any easier in all circumstances to identify the affiliation that might
work (mindful negotiator, for me) rather than backfire (Buddhist, for me).
3. The Example of Problems with the Core Concern of Autonomy
Like affiliation, similar problems arise with the core concern of autonomy.
To review, autonomy means the capacity to make meaningful decisions in
one’s life, such as to play a meaningful role in negotiation.  In Beyond Reason,
including Shell, posit that offers should not be too high, but there seems to be no scientific
evidence for this “too high” limit. SHELL, supra note 22, at 160.  Thompson says that this
fear that an offer will “insult” is “more apparent than real,” but supports her own assertion
merely with what she says “[m]anagers tell us.” THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 49.
110 Supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
111 Freshman et al., Efficient Emotion, supra note 1, at 6 n.16.
112 See generally EKMAN, supra note 45.
113 Cf. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Woody Allen Blues:  “Identity Politics,” Race, and
the Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 511, 525 (1999) (claiming that if individuals “are to protect them-
selves from political oppression, they must form coalitions around their oppression”).  For
discussion on obstacles to coalitions, see Freshman, supra note 18, at 426-39.
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for example, Fisher relates how he was driving with his wife to visit a friend’s
house.114  At one of the stops, Fisher bought a particular gift for their hosts and
received free flowers with his purchase.115  When his wife gave the flowers
away, however, Fisher was upset.116  After thinking about the situation and his
feelings, he realized he had no objection to his wife’s act— he just wished she
had talked to him first.117
To return to our business divorce, it makes sense that Jack might ask Phil
to sit down with him and brainstorm some options.  Perhaps, as Riskin, Shapiro
and Fisher predict,118 regardless of the solution, this really will make Phil feel
better because Jack has honored his autonomy.  If Jack had external mindful-
ness, however, he might notice other possibilities.  He may see that Phil also
had negative emotions.  Perhaps Phil had only negative emotions, some initial
positive emotions that faded, or some other emotional pattern.  Jack might
hypothesize that Phil didn’t like brainstorming.  It would be a hypothesis since
Phil might like brainstorming but not the way Jack did it; or, as with my reflec-
tion above, he might be in a bad mood for a totally different reason.
So, too, we should expect that moves to enhance autonomy may lead to a
variety of responses in different people.  If we can successfully make someone
feel their autonomy respected, we may discover positive emotions from them.
Recall Tom Tyler’s careful studies showing that people prefer processes like
mediation and arbitration that honor autonomy.119  Indeed, Tyler found people
prefer mediation and arbitration so much that they are often happier with an
autonomy-honoring process even when they receive worse monetary or other
tangible awards.120
Nonetheless, autonomy may sometimes backfire and trigger negative emo-
tions.  Widely reported research on choice overload suggests that “we” are
often less satisfied when “we” are given “too many” choices.121  In one often
cited study, people who had a choice of just a few chocolates were happier than
those who had the choice of more chocolates.122  Therefore, while Jack might
think he should just give Phil some optimal number of choices, this may not be
the best strategy.  In Neuro-Linguistic Psychology, trainers sometimes say,
114 FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 83 (relating story of Fisher getting a gift on a ride
with his wife).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 73, 93 (noting that negative emotions “[u]sually” arise “because a decision was
made without consulting the other person” and “respecting people’s core concern for auton-
omy . . . can stimulate positive emotions in them and in yourself”).
119 TYLER, supra note 9, at 151-52.
120 Id. at 147.
121 BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE 201 (2004); Sheena S. Iyengar, Rachael E.
Wells & Barry Schwartz, Doing Better but Feeling Worse:  Looking for the “Best” Job
Undermines Satisfaction, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 143 (2006), available at http://
www.columbia.edu/~ss957/articles/doing_better_feeling_worse.pdf; see also Alix Spiegel,
Day-to-Day:  The Mechanics of Choice:  More Isn’t Always Better (NPR radio broadcast
Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5361844;
see generally SHEENA IYENGAR, HOW WE CHOOSE:  THE SUBTEXT OF LIFE (2010).
122 SCHWARTZ, supra note 121, at 20.
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“Two is a dilemma, and three is a choice,”123 as if more than three might be
overwhelming.
As it turns out, though, a closer look at the research shows two distinct
patterns regarding how “we” handle choice.  Maximizers—those who always
want to do the very best—are less happy with more choice.124  Conversely,
satisficers—those who just want to do okay—are not any less happy with more
choices.125  For those of us who give some credence to the Meyer-Briggs per-
sonality test, differences in peoples’ preferences for choice make sense.  The
test posits that “judgers” like to take their time before making a decision while
“intuitives” like to just get the decision made and over with.126  In short, then,
Jack and the rest of us negotiators cannot assume that a mere increase in brain-
storming will make all of our opponents and counterparts127 feel better.  If Phil
is a maximizer or an intuitive, he may dislike brainstorming because it presents
too many options or takes too long to reach a decision.  Thus, Jack’s attempt to
honor Phil’s autonomy may get overshadowed by Phil’s perspective on deci-
sion-making, a function of Phil’s personality.  External mindfulness can help
Jack recognize when his focus on autonomy succeeds and when it meets
resistance.
As I am towards the end of my luxurious journey, I now reflect:  it still
feels right to say “Yes, and.”  Some research does indeed support the idea that
successful attempts to build affiliation may increase positive emotion and pro-
mote better outcomes.  And much evidence also supports the idea that success-
ful attempts to make people feel their autonomy respected will also promote
positive emotions and/or reduce negative ones.
So, after many months of reflecting and exchanging with Len and Dan—
perhaps even years if we include discussions of related topics—I’m left believ-
ing the core concerns and mindfulness are both quite valuable, and some con-
cerns remain.  In the case of both core concerns, two potential sand traps128
exist.  First, some people will not share positive responses to any attempt to
invoke particular core concerns.  Take affiliation.  Some people may be loners
who dislike community, or at least dislike it in negotiation, or in certain con-
texts of negotiation.  Second, even if we find ourselves with someone who likes
some kind of community bond, we may get wrong the kind of community she
wants:  I would be comfortable with another mindful negotiator who went to
123 Janet Konefal, Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Med., Class Lecture at
the University of Miami School of Medicine (May 1998).
124 Guthrie, supra note 27, at 605 (“[T]he very presence of multiple options has a tendency
to induce people to make suboptimal decisions.”).  For information on maximizers versus
satisficers, see, for example, Clark Freshman & Chris Guthrie, Managing the Goal-Setting
Paradox:  How to Get Better Results from High Goals and Be Happy, 25 NEGOTIATION J.
217, 220 (2009).
125 Id.
126 ISABEL BRIGGS MYERS & PETER B. MYERS, GIFTS DIFFERING:  UNDERSTANDING PER-
SONALITY TYPE 69-71 (2d ed. 1995).
127 Jonathan Cohen suggests we think of others in a negotiation as “counterparts” rather
than “opponents.”  Jonathan R. Cohen, Adversaries?  Partners?  How About Counterparts?
On Metaphors in the Practice and Teaching of Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, 20 CON-
FLICT RESOL. Q. 433, 438-39 (2003).
128 I borrow the metaphor of sand traps in negotiation from Leigh Thompson. See generally
THOMPSON, supra note 19.
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similar retreats, but I would get chilly with someone who talked about what
“we lawyers” are like.  As we saw, these same two sand traps exist for auton-
omy.  Some may prefer to have decisions made rather than make them; some
may want to “participate in the process,” but a process very different from the
kind we like.
I’ve tried to reveal these sand traps in several ways.  In part, I’ve re-
worked the particular example of the business dispute that Len painted so viv-
idly.  Implicitly, I’ve relied on an appeal to our intuitions, or perhaps our exper-
iences, of when these approaches might not work.  Also, I’ve invoked
systematic research on different accounts of personality differences and other
psychology research to suggest why people might react in different ways.
Some may be persuaded by anecdotes like Len’s, some by my appeal to intu-
itions, and some by research.  And, if I were giving this paper as a live discus-
sion, I would use external mindfulness to “read” my audience to see which
points resonated and which needed further elaboration!
IV. DIGGING DEEPER:  THE NON-EMOTIONAL APPEALS OF CORE CONCERNS
Although I raise doubts about whether the core concerns really will pro-
mote greater negotiation success in all circumstances, I have no doubt these
core concerns may be valuable in many contexts.  Narrowly defined, success
might only be a matter of increasing readily measurable outcomes.  For exam-
ple, we may measure how well “we” do by how well every party to the negotia-
tion did or, more broadly, we may measure how well all those affected by the
negotiation did.129  Alternatively, we might view outcomes in a broader way
that reflects other values.  When it comes to emotion in particular, therapeutic
jurisprudence teaches that we should consider the emotional outcome as one
value among many, including others like economic outcomes.130  Thus, we
might consider core concerns such as autonomy and affiliation to be valuable in
themselves.  Indeed, many philosophers and theorists, including legal philoso-
phers, make exactly this point on the intrinsic value of autonomy and affilia-
tion.131  On autonomy, no less an authority than the Supreme Court of the
United States teaches that autonomy is an important value even when it does
not change an outcome.132  Of course, the question then arises:  If values like
129 Judith E. Innes, Evaluating Consensus Building, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HAND-
BOOK 631, 631-42 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds.,
1999).
130 Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  A
Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE:  LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 5, 9-10 (Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce
J. Winick eds., 2000); see also Freshman & Guthrie, supra note 124, at 218.
131 For information on the value of autonomy, see, for example, RAWLS, supra note 4, at
72-81.
132 The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication.  But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and effi-
cacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
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autonomy and affiliation matter on their own, then why not just advocate for
them individually, rather than tethering them to improving emotion and negoti-
ation outcomes?  As I cannot read minds, I cannot speak for Riskin or Shapiro
and Fisher.  While I have rather strong doubts about many aspects of Freudian
analytic psychology, I do not doubt that they also have unconscious motiva-
tions.  No doubt they believe, perhaps rightly so, that attention to affiliation and
autonomy will often promote better emotional and negotiation success.  Indeed,
it works as a good general rule.  My colleagues might agree that external mind-
fulness would also improve success.  On the other hand, they might think exter-
nal mindfulness would not be worth it.  Perhaps it would be too taxing for
people to track seven elements of negotiation from the Harvard Project on
Negotiation,133 five core concerns, and seven basic emotions.134
Additionally, they may agree with me that we can promote one value by
telling people it will enhance some outcome, even when it might not.  Years
ago, I began my own research on emotion and negotiation with that explicit
idea.  My mom died from depression, and I was rather depressed in law school.
For years, I studied both negotiation and cognitive-behavioral therapy, which
many considered to be the best treatments for depression.135  I noticed a paral-
lel between the two.  Cognitive behavioral therapy teaches that people often
become depressed, or anxious, or both, when they view things too dichoto-
mously.  Hence, we might get anxious if we think we either (1) get our article
published at Harvard or (2) fail, with no gray area in between.  Instead, we
might feel better if we thought we would be happy simply to express our views
in a forum that could reach others.
As it turns out, interest-based negotiation—the kind popularized in part by
Getting to Yes—teaches similar principles.  Combining the cognitive behav-
ioral therapy and interest-based negotiation, I thought that it would be easier to
reach more people at risk of depression if I spoke about negotiation than if I
spoke about depression.  Moreover, when I set out to study this, my psychology
collaborator thought we could do even better if we taught students to pay atten-
tion to emotion in order to improve negotiation skills.  Through our experience,
my collaborator and I discovered that those with better emotional skills actually
not only did better at negotiation but even made better grades their first year of
law school!136
In conclusion, I still value internal autonomy and mindfulness of the sort
Riskin emphasizes and the external thought that I emphasize.  Furthermore, I
still value the core concerns, particularly autonomy and affiliation.  Nonethe-
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
656 (1972))
133 Cf. Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, supra note 8.
134 I am grateful to Roy Lewicki for underscoring this point when he asked about research
on how well one could “parallel process” awareness of emotion, whether this might signal
lying, and track the rest of the negotiation.  It’s a good question, and it may merit further
research.  In the meantime, I recommend, for those who can afford it, that they have one
person on “their side” track the process, including external mindfulness, and leave other
tasks to someone else to lead.
135 See, e.g., Keith S. Dobson, A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Cognitive Therapy for
Depression, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 414, 417 (1989).
136 Freshman et al., Efficient Emotion, supra note 1.
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less, I argue that we need external mindfulness to notice when those core con-
cerns—or at least the way in which we are tending to them—may not bring
about either the emotional outcomes or negotiation outcomes we seek.  Moreo-
ver, I cannot be sure whether the negative emotions I felt when writing made
me exaggerate the differences, or whether the positive emotions I felt while
reflecting on my affiliation with my friends, Dan (Shapiro) and Len (Riskin),
led me to downplay those differences and overplay the value of their work.  As
much as I wish to promote these values, I, too, feel the pull of the values—and
the feelings—of a commitment to scientific truth and romantic authenticity.137
Furthermore, I hope that I remain mindful of how these values work together,
when they diverge, and how I relate to them.
137 But see Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotia-
tion, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631 (1997).
